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EASING THE BURDEN:
MEDIATING MISDEMEANOR CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2004, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ordered a county 
sheriff to free dozens of indigent criminal defendants awaiting trial because the 
state was unable to provide them with lawyers due to an absence of pub lic 
defenders to represent the defendants at critical stages of their cases.1 This 
anecdotal evidence is one of many small signals of a clear, systemic problem: 
the American criminal justice system is failing because courts are unable to keep 
up with their caseloads.2 Some jurisdictions have begun to actively consider 
alternative approaches to lessen this burden, and a trend is growing to aid the 
courts in easing their dockets: some jurisdictions are developing mediation 
programs by which courts divert criminal cases away from traditional prosecution 
and allow a victim-offender mediation to occur as an alternative to trials for 
alleged criminal acts.3 The new model is beginning to work and annually more 
1 See Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 442 Mass. 228 (2004) 
(ordering release of defendants because of unavailability of attorneys to 
represent their constitutionally guaranteed rights).
2 See generally Rodney J. Uphoff, “The Criminal Defense Lawyer As Effective 
Negotiator: A Systemic Approach,” 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 73 (1995) (recognizing 
overburdened criminal justice system and necessity for alternative approaches).
3
 Some jurisdictions have passed laws to encourage the practice of referring 
criminal cases to mediation.  See CAL. PEN. CODE § 14152 (2004) (allowing 
mediation referrals for cases involving conduct which could be charged as a 
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than nine thousand cases are referred out of district courts by district attorneys 
and judges to dispute settlement centers; over seven thousand or more are 
resolved prior to possible court involvement, and mediation is helping as an 
alternative to courtroom trials.4
Mediation and other forms of alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) are not 
foreign to criminal law in the United States, but historically American jurisdictions 
have not used mediation to help in the adjudication of criminal cases after 
charges have been filed, but before trial.  Several jurisdictions have mediation 
programs that intervene before any criminal charges have been filed in the form 
of “community mediation.”  Others use restorative mediation to bring victims and 
offenders face-to-face after a criminal charge’s adjudication.  Finally, all 
jurisdictions allow plea bargaining to take place as a form of ADR to avoid trials, 
but typically plea bargaining involves adversarial meetings between prosecutors 
and defendants and not a neutral third-party as does mediation.   Mediation could 
be better used to solve privately filed complaints by allowing the parties to control 
misdemeanor).  Other states have no specific statutory law regarding the referral 
of criminal cases to mediation, but have created programs as part of local 
government-sponsored mediation organizations.  See, e.g. “Community 
Misdemeanor Mediation Service,” available at: 
http//:www.cdsusa.org/community.html; Florida’s “State Attorney-Referred 
Mediation,” available at: 
www.17th.flcourts.org/mediation___arbitration.html#CitizenDispute (last visited 
November 19, 2004).
4 See “Courts, Law Enforcement, and Victims of Crime,” Mediation Network of 
North Carolina, available at http://www.mnnc.org/pg10.cfm.
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the charges and should be encouraged by courts to take stress off of their 
personnel who are increasingly incapable of maintaining pace with the court’s 
docket.
This project will discuss the advantages and pitfalls of mediation to 
adjudicate misdemeanor crimes after the formal process of criminal law has 
begun but before the guilt of the defendant has been determined.5  It will do so 
by discussing how a misdemeanor complaint comes into the system; how 
different jurisdictions are using mediation in criminal cases; the philosophical, 
legal and mediation-specific issues this raises; and finally, will synthesize the 
theory of mediation with the current practice in the field of pre-trial criminal 
mediation.  Finally this project will synthesize mediation theory, current usage 
and suggest practical solutions to the use of mediation in criminal matters.
II. BACKGROUND: COMPLAINTS BROUGHT BY CIVILIANS AGAINST 
CIVILIANS
5
 This analysis will focus on matters after arrest because presumably those cases 
in which the criminal justice system has not yet become involved could easily be 
heard in traditional community mediation programs.  Furthermore, in matters in 
which the government has not yet become involved, there are fewer interesting 
legal issues related to the tension between private justice and the philosophical 
importance of punishing and rehabilitating a criminal defendant on behalf of 
society as a whole.  See infra, Section III, and accompanying notes for an in-
depth discussion of the philosophical issues of criminal mediation.  Likewise, the 
analysis here will avoid discussions of post-conviction victim-offender mediation 
because in that model, the criminal case has already been adjudicated.
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Typically, a criminal case begins after law enforcement officer has 
probable cause of criminal conduct and arrests a person.   However, some 
jurisdictions also allow private citizens to bring a complaint against another 
private citizen if the police do not arrest that person, or the police make an arrest 
and the local district attorney elects not to prosecute the case.  It is precisely 
these matters that are most appropriate for mediation because they are often 
premised on personal problems between the parties better suited for a private 
resolution other than a criminal trial.  Traditionally, courts maintain this procedure 
by allowing civilians to apply with a neutral court officer to apply for their own 
criminal charges, which are called “private complaints.”  In Massachusetts, a 
civilian has the right to seek a private complaint against a person they believe 
has committed a crime.
Procedurally, the private complaint process begins when the person that 
believes they are the victim, known as a complainant, applies to the court 
through a clerk-magistrate for a complaint.6  The clerk-magistrate then schedules
the matter for a show cause hearing to determine if the complainant can show 
probable cause exists for the court to issue a criminal complaint.7  The clerk-
magistrate can not refuse to act on the application.8  However, show-cause
hearings are an arena in which an advocate may make a significant difference on 
6
 See Massachusetts Superior Court Criminal Practice Manual § 1.2 (2000).
7 See Mass. Gen. L. c. 218, § 35A (2004).
8 See Victory Distributors, Inc. Vs. Ayer District Court, 435 Mass. 136 (2001) 
(holding private party's rights with respect to the criminal complaint process 
limited to filing of application; clerk-magistrate must act)
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behalf of his or her client by using negotiation techniques.9  Between the time the 
clerk-magistrate receive the application and the time of the show-cause hearing, 
clerks may consider alternative dispositions, including applying resolutions 
through informal negotiation between the parties.10  Without any agreement 
between the parties to dismiss the private complaint, the show- cause hearing 
goes forward.11
The clerk can encourage resolution prior to deciding if probable cause was 
shown by the complainant by continuing the matter for a period of time and 
encouraging communication between the parties.12 Private complaints are often 
simple dispute between neighbors, a fight where no one is clearly at fault, or a 
traffic dispute.  The party against whom the application is brought often applies 
for a cross-complaint, either in good-faith or in hopes of it having had the effect of 
canceling out the original complaint.  In the event of a cross-complaint, in a 
traditional adversarial criminal model, the court will be burdened with not one, but 
two criminal matters it is required to adjudicate.  Mediation of these matters 
poses a possible solution beneficial to both the parties and the system.
9 See Massachusetts Superior Court Criminal Practice Manual § 1.2 (2000).
10
 See id. at §1.2.3.
11
 See Massachusetts Superior Court Criminal Practice Manual § 1.2 (2000).
12 See Massachusetts Superior Court Criminal Practice Manual § 1.2 (2000); see 
also Bradford v. Knights, 427 Mass. 748, 751 (1998).  (stating “[a] show cause 
hearing pursuant to MASS. GEN. L. c. 218, § 35A, will often be used by a clerk -
magistrate in an effort to bring about an informal settlement of grievances, 
typically relating to minor matters involving "the frictions and altercations of daily 
life.").
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The main goal of private criminal mediation is the same as classic 
mediations: to bring together parties to voluntarily work together to create a 
resolution that adds value to both positions.  One of the most important values 
added by criminal mediation is that it allows for an exchange of explanations
between the complainant and defendant.13  The victim can explain their suffering 
to the offender in a way that expresses and tries to communicate anger and that 
condemns the crime as a wrong.14 The victim will also have a chance to come to 
understand, without condoning, the offender's action from their perspective.15
The offender will be vividly confronted, through his victim's voice, with his crime
and will also have a chance to explain himself.16 The alternative is both 
inefficient and unsatisfying: 
Consider a typical offender--a vandal, maybe, or a low-level drug 
dealer, or a thief--in a typical small criminal case. From the time of 
arrest to sentencing, criminal procedure pays little heed to his 
expressions of contrition. Beginning with arrest, he enters an 
adversarial system in which two lawyers, not the defendant and the 
victim, are the main actors. Often operating under staggering 
13
 Stephanos Bibas and Richard A. Bierschbach,  “Integrating Remorse And 
Apology Into Criminal Procedure,” 114 YALE L. J. 85, n. 216 (2004), citing R.A. 
Duff, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 93-99 (2001) (describing 
value of criminal mediation).
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
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caseloads, the lawyers are concerned with negotiating just and 
speedy dispositions. In most cases, this means cutting deals on 
charges, pleas, and sentences. In the few cases headed toward 
trial, it means investigating, planning pretrial and trial strategy, and 
dealing with motions, trial dates, and the like. In either situation, 
much negotiation is informal and takes place between the two 
repeat players, out of the defendant's presence.17
In light of the alternative of prosecution, criminal mediation provides an 
opportunity for the victim to feel justice has been done, for the offender to make 
amends and for an overburdened system to avoid further strain.
III. PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES WITH CRIMINAL MEDIATION: Whose 
Rights Are Being Mediated?
A critique of mediation for criminal cases involves a seeming shift in the 
theory underlying criminal justice, which necessarily calls on the courts to defend 
society’s collective safety from wrongdoers and exercise their collective rights to 
retribution through criminal penalties.  Alternatively, criminal mediation seems to 
favor an individual victim’s rights, regardless of the benefit to society.
Even in Massachusetts, a state with a statute specifically allow a private 
citizen to apply for a criminal complaint, in 1991, the state’s highest court seemed 
17
 Stephanos Bibas and Richard A. Bierschbach,  “Integrating Remorse And 
Apology Into Criminal Procedure,” 114 YALE L. J. 85, 96-97 (2004) (summarizing 
criminal process in minor criminal cases)
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to deal a blow to victim’s rights when it held in Taylor v. Newton Div. of the Dist. 
Court Dep’t.18 “a private citizen has no judicially cognizable interest in the 
prosecution of another.  The rights which the plaintiff seeks to enforce criminally 
are not private but in fact are lodged in the Commonwealth, though he has rights 
to proceed in a civil action.”19 The Taylor decision calls into question the right of 
the private complainant to a prosecution of an alleged offender.  Taylor, however, 
did not concern a private criminal complaint.  Rather, the issue in Taylor involved 
a citizen’s claim under the so-called Massachusetts victim’ bill of rights, which 
guarantees a prompt disposition through sentencing of any case in which they 
are the victim.  Therefore, the Taylor case is distinguishable because the statute 
it interpreted did not affect the right to bring a private action, which remains
explicitly allowed by statute, instead affecting the absence of a right of a private 
citizen to influence prosecutors to promptly sentence offenders the state has 
convicted.
The Taylor case raises a second issue relevant to private criminal 
complaints related to if the proper forum for a victim is criminal court.  Seemingly 
many of the issues raised in private criminal complaints have parallel claims that 
the victim could bring in civil court.   In some matters, for example: battery, the 
victim has a remedy under the law of tort, but by taking part in a criminal 
18
 416 Mass. 1006 (1991).
19 See Taylor v. Newton Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 416 Mass. at 1006 (holding 
private citizens have no interest in criminal complaint); see also Linda R.S. v. 
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (stating “[i]n American jurisprudence . . . a 
private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or non-
prosecution of another.").
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prosecution is represented indirectly as a member of society as a whole.  For 
example, if a person is attacked by a mugger and injured, two systems will go 
into effect: the criminal system, which will seek to, if guilty, punish and 
rehabilitate the offender on behalf of society; and the civil system, which allows 
the person directly injured to seek their own personal compensation and, in the 
case of intentional torts, punitive damages.
The tension of private justice weighed against social benefit, as well as the 
problematic merger of criminal and tort law is not a new issue, and certainly 
poses questions as to how our court system should adjudicate such parallel 
matters.20  However, so long as statutory schemes like the one in Massachusetts 
allow private citizens to file and maintain control over filed criminal complaints, it 
is necessary that we accept the consequences of the enactment of the laws and 
work to deal efficiently with the legal reality.  By swallowing the conceptual 
problem, our system can benefit society as a whole by using mediation.
IV. EVEN IF LEGAL & ENFORCEABLE, IS MEDIATION APPROPRIATE?
20
 The merger of tort and criminal law, which apparently characterized the whole 
history of primate and ancient legal regimes.  See “American Criminal Law 
Review: Winter, 2001” 38 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 111, n. 42 (2001) citing A.S. 
Diamond, PRIMITIVE LAW, PAST AND PRESENT 191-95 (1971) (discussing early 
civilization's concept of offence to all and offence to an individual). The classic 
example of this is the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, which is utterly replete 
with provisions for private prosecutions, private administration of "criminal" 
punishments, and, in some cases, a private, quasi-contractual method for 
establishing the criminal law.  Id.
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Jurisdictions considering institution of mediation programs for private 
criminal complaints, even if their laws allow it to exist, face a host of issues that 
could make mediation problematic.  For a mediation to properly work, it requires 
negotiation between equals.21  Because offenders and victims of crime are likely 
starting from unequal positions, mediators must be sensitive to issues that could 
arise. Two major issues revolve around the idea that cases suited for mediation 
often involve violence, as in the case of simple assault cases; or power 
imbalances, as in criminal proceedings between a landlord and tenant.  
Therefore, even if courts and lawmakers opt to create laws or otherwise act to 
encourage criminal mediations, they must consider situations where the facts 
surrounding the case make it difficult to solve the dispute using this technique.
A. Violence
Some jurisdictions explicitly disallow mediation when threats of violence or 
actual violence are involved.22 Although this issue has not been analyzed in the 
21 See Lydia Belzer, “Domestic Abuse and Divorce Mediation: Suggestions for a 
Safer Process,” 5 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 37, 49 (2003) (suggesting processes to 
improve mediation between individuals involved in abusive relationships)
22 See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.66.130(c) (2004).  Alaska law states “[a] court 
may not order parties into mediation or refer them to mediation for resolution of 
the issues arising from a petition for a protective order…”; see also CAL. PEN. 
CODE § 14152(a) (2004); HAW. REV. STAT. § 580- 41.5 (2004) (forbidding 
mediation where restraining order of history of child abuse exists between victim 
and offender).  Still other jurisdictions have legislated additional specific rules on 
mediations involving a history of violence: for example, Pennsylvania permits 
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context of criminal mediation, many commentators have researched the 
significance of a history of violence as affecting other types of mediation, 
especially domestic relations and divorce mediation.  Research and analysis 
applied to divorce mediation can be applied to criminal mediation where violence 
is involved because victims of violence all share the common factor in mediation 
of negotiating with an opposing party that is will to use force as a form of 
coercion.  
Commentators differ on their view of the affect of violence on the 
mediation process but commonly believe mediation should not be ruled out just 
because a history of violence exists.  By suggesting a set of procedures where 
violence is at issue, mediators can help to still create a successful resolution the 
problem at hand.  One solution is by allowing mediation, but requiring mediators 
courts to mandate parties to attend mediation orientation sessions and, should 
both parties consent to mediation, the court may then enter an order of 
mediation.  See Alexandria Zylstra, “Mediation and Domestic Violence: A 
Practical Screening Method for Mediators and Mediation Program 
Administrators.” 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 253, 263 (2001). However, state statute 
prohibits courts from mandating even the orientation session if either party or a 
child has been a victim of violence or abuse within twenty-four months prior to 
the filing of the action.  Id. In Texas, if a party requests exclusion from mediation 
based on an allegation of domestic violence, but a judge determines the 
allegation is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence, the judge may 
refer the case to mediation but must include in the order that the parties not be 
required to have face-to-face contact.  Id.
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to follow a procedure using pre-screening, information to the parties, and 
providing the parties awareness of their legal rights.23
In many cases, it will be clear that the parties have a violent history (e.g. a 
criminal mediation to resolve an assault), but even if violence is not an obvious 
sub-text of the mediation, a successful program will interview the parties 
beforehand to discover if any such issue exists.  If evidence of violence is found, 
in some jurisdictions, the mediation can proceed only if the mediation was 
requested by the victim of the violence, the mediator has been trained in dealing 
with victims of, and the victim is allowed to have a supporting person at the 
mediation.24
The victim of violence should explicitly and clearly be informed of their 
right to opt-out of the mediation for two reasons: first, because mediation is by 
definition a voluntary procedure in which either party should be able to opt-out, 
and secondly because the victim of violence is acting against their own interest if 
they continue to mediate with someone they feel has a power advantage 
because of their willingness to use violence.  If, after recognizing a violent 
history, the victim still wishes to go forward, the mediator or court could inquire as 
to why the victim wishes to go to mediation to ascertain that the reasons are not 
based on pressure from the perpetrator of violence.
23 See Lydia Belzer, “Domestic Abuse and Divorce Mediation: Suggestions for a 
Safer Process,” 5 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 37, 49 (2003).
24
 “Alabama Section: Survey Of 1996 Alabama Legislation,” 48 A LA. L. REV. 769, 
780 (1997) (describing changes to Alabama mediation law).
Gabriel H. Teninbaum
13
Before a victim makes their final decision whether or not to utilize 
mediation, it is especially important that they be aware of their legal rights.   The 
court could do so by providing some source of information to each party, 
including a trained person who can answer questions.  This would make parties 
aware of the legal implications of some of the matters that could come up in 
mediation and serve to assure them that even if the opposing party puts pressure 
on them during the mediation, they are not legally obligated to sign an agreement 
and allay the fear that “lack of cooperation” will not cut off their legal remedies.
B. Power Imbalance
In some criminal complaints, power imbalances are bound to be present 
between the victim and offender.  For example, a tenant could bring a complaint 
against a landlord who has control over their living environment for criminal 
neglect of basic living necessities the law requires a landlord to maintain.25  The 
landlord has great power in this scenario to make conditions even worse (e.g. 
shutting off the electricity or refusing to make any repairs), while the tenant’s 
power is limited.  Especially if such a situation is acrimonious, there exists a great 
power imbalance and raises questions whether it is appropriate at all to mediate 
because where the parties are unevenly matched, the "stronger" party may be 
able to impose lopsided settlement terms.26
25 See Wright v. Brockett, supra note __ and accompanying text (describing 
facts of landlord-tenant dispute leading to cross criminal complaints).
26 See “Commentary on Suitability for Mediation,” CPR Institute for Dispute 
Resolution (1998).
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However, this imbalance is not necessarily a reason to reject mediation. 
The imbalance could be offset by allowing an attorney to represent the parties to 
help balance their weakness.  Additionally, whether or not the parties are 
represented by counsel, courts could require that a judge or magistrate review 
the parties’ agreement before accepting it.  While a mediation with an imbalance 
might not be preferably, by using safeguards like allowing or requiring a 
representative to accompany the parties and the court’s approval, the settlement
through may be more desirable for even a "weak" party than the alternatives of 
direct negotiation or litigation with its "win-lose" outcome.27
V. LEGAL ISSUES UNIQUE TO CRIMINAL MEDIATION
A. Confidentiality and Evidence
Confidentiality agreements are a common practice during traditional 
family, community and business mediations and the confidentiality of the 
mediator is in some instances statutorily created.28  The Uniform Mediation Act 
dictates that information discussed during the mediation of a criminal 
misdemeanor could be subject to disclosure in a trial if no resolution is reached.29
27 Id.
28 MASS. GEN. L. c. 233, § 23C (2004).
29 See Uniform Mediation Act §6(7)(b) (defining limits of mediator confidentiality).  
The Act states “the party seeking discovery or the proponent of the evidence has 
shown that the evidence is not otherwise available, that there is a need for the 
evidence that substantially outweighs the interest in protecting confidentiality, 
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Any jurisdiction following the Uniform Mediation Act as its statutory 
scheme would have to either amend it, or would risk creating an ineffective 
system that would have a negative affect on the parties if they were unable to 
resolve their dispute using mediation.  The Uniform Mediation Act’s allowance of 
disclosure for use in criminal proceedings would create an especially grave risk 
for defendants in criminal mediations because their agreement to take part in 
mediation could lead to information that would not otherwise enter into evidence 
against them if they opted for a trial.  
Programs specifically designed to handle criminal mediation have used 
guidelines other than those proposed by the Uniform Mediation Act that are more 
protective to the defendant.  The Washington, D.C. U.S. Attorney’s Office makes 
the entire criminal mediation proceedings confidential.  The parties and mediator 
sign an agreement that the parties or the prosecutors can not use statements 
made during the mediation.  The mediator also agrees that he or she will not 
voluntarily reveal any information disclosed during the mediation without all 
parties' written consent except for information relating to domestic violence, child 
abuse or a credible threat of violence. Finally, in the Washington, D.C. program 
the parties also agree not to call the mediator as a witness in any court 
proceeding and agree not to subpoena documents or information that may be 
retained in any files of the mediator.
and that the mediation communication is sought or offered in…a court 
proceeding involving a felony or misdemeanor.”  Id.
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B. Legality and Enforceability
It is illegal in many jurisdictions for a person who has brought their own 
criminal complaint to agree not to prosecute the offender in return for receiving a 
benefit.30 A reasonable basis for such statutes is to prevent defendants from 
perverting justice by bribing or coercing witnesses or victims.  Because mediation 
in the pre-trial contexts could involve an exchange of something of value for an 
agreement not to prosecute, a question arises as to if it is legal to offer or accept 
valuable consideration in mediate criminal cases.  
A 1991 Supreme Court of New York case, Wright v. Brockett31 addressed 
the issue of accepting value for relinquishing a private criminal complaint.32  The 
30
 See e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 153 (2004); See N.Y. PEN. CODE § 215.45 (2004); 
720 ILL. ST. ANN. 5/32-1 (2004) (making offering or transferring consideration for 
agreeing not to prosecute or aid in prosecuting crime).  The New York statute 
makes it illegal to solicit, confer and accept value in exchange for not prosecuting 
a crime, which would appear on its face to make both offender and victim guilty 
of a crime for bargaining for value during a criminal mediation.  Id.
31
 571 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1991).
32 See id. at 661.  For nearly twenty years, the defendant rented an illegal 
basement apartment in plaintiffs' two-family house.  Id.  Relations between the 
parties degenerated and the plaintiff moved the court to eject the defendant.  The 
defendants filed their own criminal court claim contending that plaintiffs had 
turned off the heat and committed other acts amounting to reckless 
endangerment and other crimes.  Id.  The plaintiff-landlords then cross-
complained for criminal harassment.  Id.  The parties were referred to the local 
dispute resolution center where they resolved their dispute, each agreeing to give 
value for dropping their cross-complaints.  Id.
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New York court held: “[a] mediated agreement attained in a controversy pending 
in the criminal courts which was referred to mediation-arbitration…is not void as 
an agreement to compromise a criminal case within the meaning of [New York 
law] and is subject to enforcement as a contract.  Their reasoning was that “the 
Legislature specifically intended for the parties to resolve their disputes through 
mediation-arbitration and to abandon pending or threatened criminal prosecution. 
This newly declared public policy supersedes the common law rule codified in 
[the law forbidding accepting or offering consideration for not prosecuting a 
criminal matter].”
VI. SYNTHESIS: SETTING WORKING GUIDELINES
Jurisdictions considering taking steps to encourage mediation of private 
criminal complaints have several issues to consider before deciding the form 
their procedure will take.  To decide if private mediation of crime is appropriate, 
they must weigh the philosophical question of if a private settlement is more 
beneficial to their system than requiring a formal criminal adjudication on behalf 
of all citizens of the jurisdiction.  To answer this question, they can look to 
appellate cases weighing if under their statutes and case law, private citizens 
have a right to control the criminal process.  Next, assuming the individual state’s
laws allow for mediation in this context, they will need to decide which cases are 
appropriate for mediation.  They will need to determine if victims of violence or 
those subject to power imbalances are capable of voluntarily participating in 
mediation.  
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There are some existing models from which states can get an idea of how 
best to approach criminal mediation.  The California Misdemeanor Mediation 
Statute requires a referring district attorney to consider the nature of the conduct 
in question; the nature of the relationship between the alleged victim and the 
person alleged to have committed the conduct; and whether referral to the 
community conflict resolution program is likely to help resolve underlying issues 
which are likely to result in additional conduct which could be the subject of 
criminal charges.33  The statute specifically forbids mediation “…where there has 
been a history of child abuse, sexual assault, or domestic violence [as defined by 
California statute] between the alleged victim and the person alleged to have 
committed the conduct, or where a protective order, as defined [by California 
law], is in effect.34
The Washington, D.C. program has devised a similar screening system to 
limit the field of crimes available for mediation to minor misdemeanors, and 
avoiding mediation for felonies, abuse and any case with a serious power 
imbalance making a person incapable of taking part in mediation.35  The staff 
also screens to consider other concurrent or related cases involving the parties in 
the case being reviewed; relevant criminal history including prior convictions; and 
33 See CAL. PEN. CODE § 14152(a) (2004) (defining considerations District 
Attorney must undertake before referring matter to mediation)
34 Id.
35 See Remarks of Steven P. Dinkin, Community Dispute Resolution Center, 
“Community Dispute Resolution Linked with the United States Attorney's Office 
and Community Prosecution in the Nation's Capital,” January, 2001, available at:
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/prosecution/dc-cdr.htm
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prior record of abiding to mediation agreements reached through the USAO 
mediation program.36
The California statute and Washington, D.C. policies both successfully 
answers questions important to mediation.  By their enactment as law, the 
California legislature answered that private remedies gained through criminal 
mediation can outweigh the societal importance of a public trial.  By requiring 
referring district attorneys to consider the nature of the crime, they are building in 
a safeguard that would allow prosecutors to not refer cases that they believe 
would be more appropriately handled in criminal court.  The explicit language 
forbidding mediation when there has been abuse, California demonstrated a 
policy of disallowing mediation where abuse, which holds with it the specter of 
more serious crimes, violent crime and a power imbalance exists.  The California 
statute provides further protection by requiring prosecutors to consider the 
relationship between the parties, which allows them to use their judgment in all 
cases to determine the existence of a violent history, strong power imbalance, or 
other factor that would make mediation unfair.  Finally, the California statute 
wisely requires prosecutors to consider if the use of mediation is likely to repair 
the underlying issues.  This requirement goes to the general effectiveness of 
mediation: by reviewing the underlying issues, it allows the district attorney to 
determine if the mediation will be truly effective, or if additional means of dispute 
resolution would better suit the issue to create a lasting resolution.
V. SUCCESS OF EXISTING PROGRAMS
36 Id.
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Empirical evidence shows that mediation is an effective too in clearing 
court dockets and lessening burdens on prosecutors and police officers.37  In 
2002, shortly after implementing the Washington D.C. misdemeanor mediation 
program, a representative of the Washington, D.C. U.S. Attorney’s Office testified 
before Congress: “We have recently started a misdemeanor mediation project 
aimed at resolving, short of a trial, recurring problems. This removes a number of 
other cases from the criminal calendar...”38  The Washington, D.C. program 
report that approximately 80% of their cases are resolve through mediation and 
diverted from prosecution.39  A Colorado district court that began a similar 
program reported that 89% of the cases resolved, and found the program so 
successful that they were considering expanding.40
While the limited statistics available evidencing successes of the criminal 
mediation programs are indicative of the growing use of this form of alternative 
dispute resolution, only with anecdotal evidence can one see the real and 
positive effects on the lives of the participants.  One commentator reports a 
37 See supra, note 2 and accompanying text.
38 See Remarks of Linda A. Cinciotta, Director, Office of Dispute Resolution, U.S. 
Department of Justice in speech “Alternative Dispute Resolution Comes of Age in 
the Federal Government,” October 28, 2003, available at: 
http://www.usdoj.gov/odr/aatllegalcenter102803.htm.
39 See supra, note 32, “Community Dispute Resolution Linked with the United 
States Attorney's Office and Community Prosecution in the Nation's Capital.”
40
 Justin Kelly, “Unique Criminal Mediation Pilot Program Set to Expand” 
ADRWorld.com, Nov. 10, 2004, available at
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criminal mediation of a neighborhood vandalism, in which nine families became 
involved in restoring damage done to the victim's home.41  Each child involved 
apologized to the homeowner and explained the details of the damage he had 
caused.42 Then each child paid twenty-eight dollars that he, not his parents, 
earned in order to pay for repairs and agreed not to retaliate against the 
homeowner's son.43
This case of neighborhood vandalism could have resulted in criminal 
convictions of the children involved causing a lifelong negative impact on them, 
could have hurt neighborhood relations between the victim and the children’s 
parents for being involved in the children’s punishment, taken a lengthy time and 
caused the government to expend its limited money and resources to prosecute 
this matter.  Instead, the payments reimbursed the victim for the damage; the 
promises restored the homeowner's sense of security in the neighborhood; and 
the apology vindicated the homeowner's sense of moral indignation while his 
forgiveness reconciled the neighbors.
VI. CONCLUSION
Both empirical and anecdotal evidence demonstrate that mediation is an 
appropriate and helpful option in mediating minor criminal matters.  Because few 
41 Deborah L. Levi, “The Role of Apology in Mediation,” 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 
1202 (1997) (sharing anecdote demonstrating success of mediation in minor 
criminal matter).
42 Id.
43 Id.
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states have statutes explicitly creating guidelines for criminal mediation, those 
jurisdictions building programs will have to consider many issues, both legal and 
ethical before proceeding with criminal mediation.  Challenges clearly remain, but 
by taking the opportunity to try criminal mediation as an alternative to trials, our 
society can benefit through the same principle that underlie mediation by creating 
a voluntarily system in which victim and offenders can come together to air their 
grievances, allowing our legal system and society as a whole can create a more
just and efficient criminal justice system.  
